The Epistemic Closure Principle By Edmund Gettier

Alexander Jerde Phil 312 10/20/2014 The Epistemic Closure Principle The Epistemic closure principle explains that knowledge can be gained by the logically implied inferences between a predicate, based on past experience, and a conclusion. By definition epistemic closure purports that we are justified in believing that our logical inferences are true. Therefore, we can conclude that our past experience (predicate) is a reason to believe a proposition. This principle has been used as the basis of various forms of skeptical arguments against the traditional analysis and inductive/deductive reasoning. Such an example was presented by Edmund Gettier, whose arguments question if we are justified in believing our beliefs as knowledge. Also, Hume questioned if we can really trust inductive/deductive reasoning. In the following I will argue that even though, Gettier’s arguments hold some truth, we are still caused to conclude that the epistemic closure is a logical necessity and true. The epistemic closure principle stat es that knowledge can be gained by acceptance of predicates logically implied relationship with their conclusions. Epistemic closure entails that, deductive and logical reasoning are sound principles of reaching knowledge. Also that, a conclusion (proposition) can be known then by understanding that a necessary logical or deductive inference between a predicate and a conclusion exist. Epistemic closure also entails that we are justifiedShow MoreRelated Evidential Basis in Epistemic Justification Essay5302 Words   |  22 PagesThe Significance and Priority of Evidential Basis in Epistemic Justification ABSTRACT:There are various approaches to epistemology as well as to the philosophy of science. The attempt to naturalize them is the newest approach. In the naturalistic framework, epistemology turns out to be identical with the philosophy of science. The main characteristic of both naturalized epistemology and naturalized philosophy of science is their methodological monism. Therefore, both of these meta-level areas